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This study examines whether former politicians on corporate boards may be helpful 
for the implementation of green strategies. Following a resource-based view of the 
firm, we argue that directors with a political background can provide firms with 
resources and capabilities that are valuable for meeting communication and 
implementation challenges of creating an effective and substantive environmental 
management strategy. We also consider the possibility that appointments of 
politicians to the board are purely symbolic acts intended to enhance the public’s 
image, without any change in the environmental performance of the firm. We develop 
testable hypotheses for each of these ideas.  
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Outside directors on boards  can help firms  by providing a multitude of external resources 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As business 
experts they may support firms in decision making and problem solving, bring in alternative 
viewpoints and act as channels of communication between firms. As support specialists they may 
bring to the firm specialized expertise on law, banking, insurance and public relations or provide 
it with financial or legal aid. Finally, as community influentials they may provide non-business 
perspectives and expertise about as well as influence with powerful groups in the community 
(Hillman et al., 2000). In all of these functions, outside directors may also provide the firm with 
legitimacy in its institutional and business environment, which is necessary for the survival of 
firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Only recently, research on outside directors has added a new dimension. Following the resource-
dependency perspective, an emerging literature focuses on the role that former politicians may 
play on corporate boards, with a particular emphasis on their social capital stemming from their 
relations to governmental institutions (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008; Hillman, 
2005). The focus of these studies is the substantive aid that former politicians on boards can give 
to firms in order to reduce uncertainty from the governmental environment and thus to aid in the 
“political strategy” of a firm (Hillman, 2005). Essentially, this prior work on politicians as board 
members has emphasized the political contacts as well as a number of skills (e.g., organization 
and communication),  or,  in other words, the valuable resources that these persons could 
contribute when sitting on corporate boards. We take these studies as inspiration for exploring 
deeper the specific resources that former politicians can bring to the firm and neglect the IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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perspective on external dependencies for this. In other words, we change the perspective on 
former politicians from a resource dependency perspective to the resource-based view (RBV – 
e.g., Wernerfeld, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) following the intuition  that a resource 
dependency perspective may only partially explain the value potential that former politicians 
may bring to firms. Specifically, we  investigate whether former politicians on boards can be a 
valuable, rare, and hard-to-imitate resource for important areas of firm strategy other than the 
political strategy and explore their effect on the firm´s environmental management efforts and 
results. Besides being an increasingly important area of firm strategy that has recently attracted 
much academic attention (e.g., Hart, 1995, 1997; Russo & Fouts, 1997; King & Lenox, 2002), 
environmental management also shows some similarities to political strategy in that both types 
of strategies share some of the same human and social capital patterns and thus require the 
service of similar external resources.  
 
Specifically, we argue that former politicians on boards can substantially contribute to 
environmental management through their advice and counsel, channels of communication and 
information between the firm and external organizations, preferential access to commitments or 
support from important elements outside the firm, and legitimacy. We thus consider explicitly 
the resource endowments of former politicians and integrate the same into a model of 
environmental management on the firm level, which details the relationship between 
environmental efforts and firm performance. 
  
We further hypothesize that former politicians could be taken on boards with the express 
intention of supporting the firm as a more “symbolic” act (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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Westphal & Zajac, 1994). We draw on institutional theory to explore if former politicians might 
be elected to boards to signal to stakeholders that the respective firm is engaging or at least 
planning to engage in green production  efforts  and thereby create legitimacy for the firm 
(DiMaggio  &  Powell, 1983, Meyer &  Rowan 1977). In this case, the firm may mitigate 
stakeholder pressures for some time  -  for instance by developing environmental production 
processes - but would leave their level of substantive environmental performance unchanged or 
even deteriorate it (Westphal &  Zajac, 1998; David  et al., 2007; Berrone &  Gomez-Mejia, 
2009b). 
 
Our work contributes to the literature on board performance by extending the analysis of director 
backgrounds from a resourced based view perspective. This will help our understanding of the 
complex relationships between board appointments, specific firm strategies and eventual firm 
performance. Furthermore, we are also contributing to the literature on environmental 
management, and in particular the emerging perspectives of “environmental governance” (e.g., 
Berrone  &  Gomez-Mejia, 2009a), by investigating the influence of board directors and 
particularly those with a political background, on environmental performance on the firm level.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the literature on the importance of the board 
of directors for firm performance and the emerging perspectives added to this literature by a 
focus on politicians as members of such boards. In order to develop testable hypotheses, we then 
analyze what challenges firms face with respect to implementing an effective environmental 
strategy or otherwise managing the public expectations regarding environmental performance 
and match these challenges with the resources that former politicians on the board  could IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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potentially supply. Since we are in the process of data collection, we do not offer an empirical 





The important role that corporate boards play for firm performance has long been acknowledged 
in the literature (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Judge Jr. & Zeithaml, 1992).  By monitoring the 
CEO, providing services such as linkages to important external actors, and giving advice for 
strategic decisions, board directors force managers to behave in the interest of firm owners, as 
well as provide them with external resources and expertise (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Markarian & Parbonetti, 2007; for a review of board directors’ contribution to 
strategy: Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). 
  
A particular stream within this literature has focused on how board composition and the 
characteristics of board directors affect the efficacy of these roles. Certo (2003), for example, 
suggest that investors value board prestige and that IPO firms achieve a higher market 
performance with prestigious board directors. Furthermore, Haunschild & Beckman (1998) find 
that interlocks matter when they provide complementary information to firms  not available 
through other sources, while Daily & Dalton (1994) identified board quality as one predictor of 
bankruptcy. Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold (2000), finally, developed a new taxonomy of board 
directors that satisfies the resource-providing role of board directors, classifying them as insiders, 
support specialists, business experts, and community influentials. Within this field, several 
researchers have analyzed what effects directors that come from particular groups such as IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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women, minorities, or, in fact, former politicians may have on board and firm performance. 
However, while the literature on particularly women directors is already quite substantial (e.g., 
Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009), our understanding of what role former politicians can or do 
play on corporate boards is just emerging (Faccio, 2006; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008). 
The potential benefits of close relations with the political arena as a means for establishing 
competitive advantages have long been a topic of inquiry by public policy researchers (e.g. 
Capron  &  Chatain, 2008; Keim &  Baysinger, 1988). Specifically, as, for example, Marcus, 
Kaufman, & Beam (1987) argue, firms use political activities to establish social legitimacy, or, 
as Shaffer (1995) points out, to influence regulatory processes around protectionism, 
environmental issues, military procurement and deregulation, prices and market entry. At the 
core of firms’ political strategies lies therefore the attempt to gain and maintain access to those 
who make public policy. By means of this access firms may acquire information that help them 
to anticipate changes in the policy environment, are able to build strategic alliances with 
legislators and regulators, increase their ability to survive by decreasing uncertainty in the 
political domain, and shape public policies, for example by influencing regulatory and legislative 
processes (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). In addition, firms use 
several tactics such as lobbying, making financial contributions, or mobilizing grassroots 
constituencies (Getz, 1993; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Lord, 2000). As a result, firms seem to 
profit  from political connections by showing a higher financial performance than those not 
connected (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001) and being more likely to be bailed out (Faccio, Masulis, 
& McConnell, 2006). 
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Despite this ample work on the effects of connections between the political and the corporate 
sector, the role of former politicians who join corporate boards has only received scant attention. 
This surprises even more,  considering the apparent importance that firms assign to having 
politicians join their boards. In fact, between 1973 and 2007, the number of large corporate 
boards whose members include former government officials has grown from 14 to 52 percent 
(Korn/Ferry International, 2009), suggesting that former politicians may provide some benefits 
for firms that other directors do not provide. 
 
According to the extant literature, these benefits may be rooted in the fact that former politicians 
possess human and social capital that can be leveraged for firms (Lester  et al., 2008). For 
example, former politicians on the board can be helpful in giving advice and counsel, creating 
channels of communication and information between the firm and external organizations, 
providing preferential access to, or commitments and support from important elements outside 
the firm, as well as creating legitimacy for firms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, 2005). In 
this context, Lester et al. (2008) show that the more government service tenure and prior political 
service jobs with high complexity and prestige former politicians have accumulated, the stronger 
their human and social capital will be. One potential benefit of these skills likely consists of 
exploiting the ex-politicians’ human and social capital in order to reduce uncertainty from the 
external environment such as that from regulatory institutions. Accordingly, Hillman (2005) 
finds that in particular in regulated industries, bringing former politicians on boards seems to pay 
off as firms with former politicians on boards show higher financial performance than firms 
without them.  
 IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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Interestingly, the prior literature discussing the role of politicians on firm boards has near 
exclusively focused on firms’ political strategies, the linkages between former politicians on the 
board and firms’ political environment, and firms’ financial performance as a result of these 
strategies. In addition, the theoretical perspective so far is primarily based on the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) as former politicians on the board are seen to 
serve the firm by reducing political environmental uncertainty.  
 
Yet, from a broader perspective, the ability of former politicians to reduce political uncertainty 
for firms due to prior connections or other skills built during their political careers also clearly 
constitutes an important resource that from the perspective of a firm is potentially valuable as 
well as in rare supply (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Lester et al., 2008). Thus, while exploring 
former politicians on corporate boards from a resource dependence theory perspective  prior 
literature has also and essentially shed light on the specific skills that politicians have developed 
during their political tenure and that can be put to use by firms interested in shoring up the 
effectiveness of their political strategy. By this, prior work had a resource-based view (Barney, 
1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993) perspective inherent. 
 
We intend to develop this resource-based view of former politician effects further by analyzing 
the resource base that politicians bring with them and identifying to what extent not only the 
political but also other firm strategies could potentially benefit from the skill set that politicians 
have to offer. In particular, in this paper we focus on the effect that former politicians on the 
board might have on an increasingly important area of firm strategy, which, furthermore, seems 
particularly suited to draw on the types of skills that former politicians are likely to bring to the IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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firm: firm environmental management. We develop hypotheses as to whether or not former 
politicians on the board  can or will be helpful in aiding firms to develop substantive 
environmental strategies and to what extent firms would actually value to have former politicians 
on the board; in a second step, we then examine what actual effects we may expect to happen 
when politicians are on the board. When it comes to strategy issues other than the political policy 
of a firm, however, one may ex-ante also question whether politicians can or do play a role here, 
and whether that role consists in substantive aid to firm strategy, or perhaps only serves in a 




Environmental performance is a major concern for society today. What started with minority 
groups such as the Green parties in the late  1970s and non-profit activity groups such as 
Greenpeace has become a worldwide movement, especially in the so-called developed countries. 
Waste-reduction, CO2 emissions’ reduction, or energy savings are major issues today, discussed 
in the political arena, pressured by activity groups, and increasingly demanded by consumers 
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). Accordingly, institutional pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) for firms to become “green” are increasing, which suggests that 
individual firms will feel more and more compelled to show a high level of environmental 
performance - to insulate themselves from negative reactions from their environment or to even 
benefit actively from these trends and turn their environmental management approach into a 
competitive advantages (e.g., Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a; King & Lenox, 2000; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998). In the next sections, we argue that these tendencies create severe challenges 
for firms, especially in polluting industries, and that politicians on corporate boards have key 
capabilities that can help firms to master these challenges. IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 




Challenges for firms in polluting industries 
The literature on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 19984) suggests that active stakeholder 
management can effectively mitigate social pressures and even create financial benefits (Hillman 
& Keim, 2001; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Smith, 1987). Governmental institutions, in particular, 
are one of firms’ primary stakeholders as they influence the rules of commerce, the structure of 
markets, the offerings of goods and services that are permissible, and  the sizes of markets 
(Schuler et al., 2002). For firms in polluting industries, regulatory institutions such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may be a particularly important source of uncertainty 
as this agency prosecutes environmental offenders and, furthermore, annually publishes toxic 
spill data on a set of nearly 500 regulated chemicals in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). The 
TRI has, in fact, by  now become a highly regarded and extremely well publicized tool for 
assessing particular firm’s environmental performance. Achieving a better fit between the firm’s 
environmental profile and regulations, for example through compliance with existing rules or 
through influencing regulators, may thus cause fewer penalties and hence achieve a direct 
financial benefit. In addition, other stakeholders such as media organizations, activity groups, 
suppliers, or employees may be important stakeholders (Berrone &  Gomez-Mejia, 2009a; 
Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). While positive reports in the media or at least the avoidance of 
negative reports about a company may increase its reputation among customers, also the support 
of activity groups such as Greenpeace may be helpful in building a positive image to the public, 
and suppliers as well as potential future employees may prefer a firm with a green image to a 
firm with a dirty one (for an overview on advantages for firms engaging in social issues see 
Berrone & Gomez-Mejía, 2009b). IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 




Hence, managing these interest groups may be important for the survival of firms particularly in 
polluting industries, be that through investments into a strong environmental policy that leads to 
effectively greener production and thus the approval of these interest groups, or through a more 
symbolic approach  (Westphal  &  Zajac, 1994) that attempts to sway the opinion of these 
stakeholders without actually going through the complex, time consuming and difficult process 
of setting up an effective environmental strategy. Accordingly, the challenge for the firm on the 
communications side is to create a good environmental image for the firm, which may then lead 
to higher revenues or lower costs. 
 
While the value of maintaining organizational legitimacy by showing to comply with the 
expectations of various stakeholders regarding  environmental performance is a relatively 
straightforward example of avoiding negative reactions (e.g., consumer boycotts or fines from 
regulatory institutions), the rationale for gaining strategic benefits from an active approach to 
environmental management requires some elaboration. In fact, the empirical literature on 
environmental issues suggests that environmental investments could lead to financial gains, but 
only if these investments have top management support, are substantial and pro-active in the 
sense that firms do not just fulfill  governmental requirements but actively shape their 
environmental strategy, and ongoing (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Russo & 
Fouts, 1997;  Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a).  Such pro-active and intense environmental 
management programs could lead to above average returns in a number of ways. First, by 
creating legitimacy with environmentally concerned external stakeholders – as discussed above – 
which could lead to attracting new customers or benefitting from governmental subsidies, but IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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also with  internal stakeholders like employees,  if these groups value a firms environmental 
stance enough to extend the term of their cooperation (e.g., attracting and retaining good 
employees) or otherwise offer better exchange relationships  (e.g.,  Porter  &  Kramer, 2007). 
Second, by developing complex organizational and hard-to-copy capabilities, which in the 
process of creating a full-scale environmental management program usually requires the 
integration of various stakeholders such as suppliers or customers (Delmas, 2001; Hillman & 
Keim, 2001), the firm may become enabled to more efficiently and competitively use firm assets 
to realize net cost savings (i.e., cost saving process innovations), but also – again – to tie key 
stakeholders like suppliers, employees or customers closer to itself  (Sharma  &  Vredenburg, 
1998). Finally, the development of these environmental capabilities can also lead to product 
innovations (with an environmental twist) that may allow the firm to charge higher margins in 
the market (e.g.,  Porter  & van der Linde, 1995). In essence, competitive advantage through 
environmental efforts is achieved if firms manage to develop a complex set of valuable, rare, 
hard to imitate or substitute resources and capabilities that allow them to positively differentiate 
from their competitors in a sustainable way (Barney, 1991).  
However, implementing a substantial environmental strategy implies significant implementation 
challenges for a firm. For example, it may imply an environmentally-oriented redesign of the 
whole company (Hart, 1995; Russo &  Fouts, 1997), the introduction of an Environmental 
Management System (Klassen & Whybark, 1999), or an organization-wide involvement by 
going through the ISO14001 EMS certification (Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003). Moreover, 
in order to achieve financial benefits by environmental performance, firms may need to build 
strong relationships with stakeholders (Delmas, 2001; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006) or redesign the 
CEO’s compensation system (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009b). Organizations to become green IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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and realize financial benefits at the same time, thus, need to go beyond simple compliance with 
regulations (Oliver, 1991) towards a pro-active, holistic, and ongoing environmental strategy. 
The implementation of such a strategy may require internal resources and capabilities such as 
technical information and implementation capabilities as well as external resources and 
capabilities such as relations to governmental institutions, the communication with activity 
groups and the management of media organizations. Altogether, the challenges of a firm are to 
actually create a functioning environmental management approach that leads to a good 
environmental performance of the firm and, in the process, potentially to higher revenues or 




Challenges for firms in polluting industries 
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Furthermore, it is a reasonable assumption that firms will differ systematically in terms of their 
perceived need to tackle these challenges and create an environmental program that leads to 
substantive  –  or perhaps only symbolic –  improvements in their green performance. Most 
obviously, such a need would be higher in industries where firms are under high scrutiny or 
where stakeholders exercise a large degree of pressure on firms to be more environmentally 
friendly (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). Especially highly polluting industries (Berrone & Gomez-
Mejia, 2009a) or such that sell primarily to the end consumer appear likely to expose firms to a 
high degree of pressure on this issue.  
How can former politicians on boards help? 
 
We argue that former politicians possess some of the key capabilities that could be leveraged by 
firms for mastering the huge implementation and communication challenges of implementing a 
substantial environmental strategy. Prior research suggests that former politicians are helpful for 
reducing uncertainty for the firm, particularly by providing advice, communication channels, 
networks, and legitimacy (Hillman, 2005). However, arguing from the resource-based view we 
assume that former politicians themselves can be seen as a resource and provide the firm with 
capabilities. For example, they may have  communication and impression management 
capabilities (De Landtsheer, De Vries, & Vertessen, 2008; Smith, Smith Powers, & Suarez, 
2005; Stanyer, 2008) that could be leveraged by firms for the creation of legitimacy and the 
crafting of an effective communication strategy. In addition, former politicians may have 
experience in the public process and social issues and therefore skills to manage relations with 
(or influence) regulatory institutions, interest groups, and media organizations. Finally, former 
politicians may  provide technological knowledge about environmental issues  and links to IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
14 
 
specific interest groups.  We therefore assume that former politicians are potentially very 
valuable for firms in both managing stakeholders, as well as in implementing a substantive 
environmental strategy. This should be the case especially for firms in polluting industries where 
pressures from regulatory institutions and activity groups may be particularly high and where 
consumers may become increasingly demanding for "greenness" in times of the global warming 
increase and rising media coverage of environmental topics. 
 
Moreover, prior research has identified a number of  issues that would tend to enhance the 
strength of these skills, in particular political tenure  as that increases the likelihood that 
politicians acquire the skills that we are ascribing them here, serving in complex and prestigious 
positions during their political career, which would likewise aid in the development of deep 
communication, problem solving and other skills, as well as the time that has lapsed since the 
last political office, because skills that are based on the prestige or their exiting contacts are 
likely to decay over time (e.g., Lester et al., 2008). In the context of environmental management, 
however, we have to add another condition to this list – that is the extent to which former 
politicians have accumulated actual environmental policy experience. Obviously, the more 
insights politicians have into the details of environmental regulation or technology, and the more 
they have build up a pro-environmental public image, the more they are likely to be of value in 
helping firms to address their environmental challenges. Therefore, and since we argued before 
that these politicians will tend to be more valuable to firm for which environmental issues are 
particularly important, we suggest: 
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Hypothesis 1a. The more urgency environmental issues have for firms (dirty industries, 
consumer goods industries, high stakeholder pressures), the more likely they will hire 
former politicians to their board of directors. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The more experience former politicians have with environmental issues, 
the more likely they will join a corporate board. 
 
We will now explore how these various skills of politicians could be applied to the 




The creation of a sound and effective environmental management strategy in order to lead the 
firm to substantively good environmental performance is a difficult and highly involved task 
(e.g., Hart, 1995; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a). Among other things, such a strategy may 
require detailed knowledge about legal constraints and political requirements, expectations from 
activity groups, in depth knowledge about technologies, or environmental data. Politicians, 
especially when they have been working in environmental committees or have otherwise 
concentrated on environmental issues during their political career, may provide the firm with 
deep insights into environmental concerns that firms may use for designing milestones of a 
substantive environmental strategy that is both effective in achieving the environmental 
performance objectives and efficient in its financial investments. For example, politicians with 
experience in environmental fields may have a more accurate understanding of the “state of the IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
16 
 
art” of environmental technology than individual firms, know vendors of environmental 
technologies, or have contacts to research and development centers in this area. Therefore, we 
argue: 
 
Hypothesis 2a.  Firms with former politicians on the board, who have a policy 
background in environmental issues, have a stronger and more effective environmental 
management strategy. 
 
Practically, this would, for example, imply that we observe that firms with former politicians on 
the board pollute less than firms without them. 
 
A particular instance of valuable insights that politicians may bring with them concerns the 
environmental regulation itself. Specifically, the EPA frequently augments the list of regulated 
chemicals that firms have to report on in the event of a an accidental spill (e.g., the EPA is 
currently in the process to add CO2 to the list of regulated substances – New York Times, 2009). 
Politicians who may have advanced knowledge of (or simply deep insights into) the EPAs 
regulation could thus aid the firm in positioning itself to anticipate future moves by the EPA, 
which may afford these firms an advantage over their competitors. 
 
Hypothesis 2b.  Firms with former politicians on the board, who have a policy 
background in environmental issues, will be able to position themselves to make use of 
future regulatory changes 
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Practically, this would, for example, imply that these firms pollute less than other firms 
specifically with respect to controlled toxic chemical compounds that are newly added to the 
TRI, but not necessarily others. 
 
Communication challenges 
We have argued that former politicians on the board can aid firms in implementing substantial 
environmental management strategies. However, the implementation of such a strategy must also 
be accompanied by efforts to communicate that program to the pertinent stakeholders in order to 
increase the firm’s environmental legitimacy. Specifically, critical stakeholders such as 
governmental institutions, Environmental Non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), media, or 
local communities  may have the power to positively shape the firm’s reputation and thus 
contribute to the differentiation strategy that underlies the firm’s environmental management. 
Firms investing substantially in their environmental performance thus  have an interest that 
stakeholders are informed adequately as a base for creating legitimacy and a differentiated brand.  
 
For politicians, on the other hand, their personal success depends at least to a sizable extent on 
their reputation among voters, in their party, or among highly influential people such as other 
politicians outside of their party or business people. Politicians build this legitimacy either by 
directly communicating with these target groups or by indirectly communicating with them 
through media organizations (De Landtsheer et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2005; Stanyer, 2008). The 
communication or impression management skills needed for creating such a positive reputation 
as well as the reputation itself may be especially high when politicians have tenure and have 
been exposed to the public, for instance through prestigious positions such as senators, IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
18 
 
congressmen, or presidential cabinet secretaries. Both, the communication skills and the 
reputation of former politicians may help firms to communicate credibly their environmental 
strategy to key stakeholder groups. Moreover, it is a reasonable assumption that former 
politicians, who have served in important positions linked to environmental affairs (e.g., 
membership in committees charged with environmental oversight) may have a higher degree of 
legitimacy in environmental issues, a better understanding of the specific means of 
communication with environmental stakeholders, and may have established links with these 
groups. Therefore we argue that this type of former politicians is well suited to translate the 
firm’s environmental efforts to a broad audience of environmental stakeholders. Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis  3a.  Firms with former  politicians on the board with high-level policy 
experience in environmental matters have a better environmental reputation than other 
firms. 
 
A simple corollary of these ideas is that politicians that have formed strong links to important 
stakeholder groups such as ENGOs may be even better suited to forge a strong communication 
strategy for a firm’s environmental management efforts.  
 
Hypothesis 3b. Firms with former politicians on the board with links to environmental 
interest groups have a better environmental reputation than other firms. 
 
Furthermore, if such politicians are indeed more valuable for firms, we also expect: 
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Hypothesis 3c. Politicians with links to environmental interest groups are more likely to 
be hired onto corporate boards than politicians without such links. 
 
So far, we have analyzed the case where firms are engaged in an active process of active 
environmental management in order to actually improve their environmental performance and 
communicate this to important stakeholders and create environmental legitimacy. If this is true 
we should expect firms with former politicians on the board to not only gain a big environmental 
reputation but also to profit from this financially, for example by realizing higher sales or facing 
fewer regulatory fines. However, besides actually substantively improving firm environmental 
performance, there may be other ways for firms to attain such a positive image and financial 





In the US context, the environmental protection agency (EPA) is probably the most important 
source of institutional pressures for superior environmental performance for firms. Starting in 
1970, the EPA has put an increasing number of toxic chemicals (currently more than 500) under 
regulation and required firms to report any spills, leaks or other breaches that allowed these 
chemicals to escape into the water, land or air. Annually, the EPA publishes these toxic spill data 
in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which by now has become a highly regarded and 
extremely well publicized tool for assessing particular firm’s environmental performance. 
Numerous academic articles are based on these data and analysts and shareholders do appear to 
pay attention to it (e.g., King & Lenox, 2000, 2002; Joshi, Khanna, & Sidique, 2005). In addition IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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to showing the relative cleanness or dirtiness of particular firms (thus allowing a judgment as to 
the degree of their environmental efforts), high polluting firms are also very likely to be fined by 
the EPA for environmental violations. Besides monetary  fines levied against firms, 
environmental enforcement lawsuits in the US also often turn directly against firm executives or 
directors, who may be sentenced to fines or even jail terms. Environmental law enforcement in 
2008, for instance, resulted in $68.5 million in criminal fines and 57 years of prison time (U.S. 
EPA, 2008). 
 
Following prior work (Hillman, 2005), one conjecture within this context would clearly be that 
politicians may use their connections, reputation, and experience with political processes and 
environmental issues to avert potential environmental enforcement actions to protect firm assets 
and executive or director’s personal liability. If that were the case we should find that firms with 
more former politicians on the board have fewer environmental enforcement rulings against them 
(or pay lower fines) – even if they have the same substantive environmental performance as 
other firms. This effect should be stronger the more tenure these politicians have, the more 
influential positions they had in their active political career, and the less time has passed since 
their departure from politics (Lester et al., 2008).  
 
Hypothesis 4. Firms with more former politicians on the board and similar environmental 
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We have argued that former politicians are taken onto boards because they can provide firms 
with valuable resources for implementing environmental strategies. We therefore expect firms 
with former politicians on the board to be better equipped for successfully implementing such a 
strategy and actually perform better in environmental terms than firms without former politicians 
on the board. However, apart from aiding the firm in the creation of substantive environmental 
practices,  former politicians on the board  could potentially also be used in a more or less 
symbolic way (i.e., to perform a window-dressing  function for the firm),  for example by 
leveraging the former politicians’ personal legitimacy to gain legitimacy for the firm and thus 
mitigate stakeholder pressures. Prior research has shown that firms sometimes use symbolic 
actions in lieu of substantive underlying activities to reduce stakeholder pressures (Westphal & 
Zajac 1994; Zajac & Westphal 1995; Wade, Porack, & Pollock 1997). Westphal & Zajac (1998), 
for instance, found that the simple announcement of stock buybacks, or the announcement of 
enhancements in the quality of corporate governance can lead to significant abnormal 
shareholder returns, even when no substantive actions to actually implement these 
announcements follows. In these examples, shareholders appear content to change their opinion 
of the value of the firm (and hence bid up their shares) purely based on observing the firm’s 
announcements, and do not seem to realize that these are simply symbolic acts.  In the current 
context, since politicians presumably amass connections, power, and prestige (Lester et al., 
2008), firms may be tempted to use the very appointment of these politicians as a symbol to their 
various stakeholder groups, that the firm intends to better its environmental performance. Several 
studies have indeed shown how the reputation of the corporate board can have benefits for the 
firm.  Certo (2003), for example, has found evidence that board prestige signals organizational 
legitimacy to investors in an IPO context, leading to an improved IPO firm stock performance. IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
22 
 
Similar, in a theoretical paper Hillman & Dalziel (2003) link the construct of board capital to 
several  potential  advantages for firms, for instance, the attainment of legitimacy and the 
bolstering of the firm’s public image (Selznick, 1949).  
 
We expect a similar effect when former politicians join corporate boards, especially the more the 
politicians in question have created for themselves the necessary prestige and believability that 
would signal to the shareholders that they  would actually be driving the firm to a better 
environmental policy. In fact, politicians themselves can be expected to have an interest in a 
positive public image of the  firm they join, for instance  as an environmentally responsible 
organization, because otherwise their personal reputation might be at risk (De Landtsheer et al., 
2008; Smith et al., 2005, Stanyer, 2008). It is precisely the assumption among stakeholders that 
politicians would not risk their reputation by joining or speaking for a “dirty” firm, or, at the very 
least, that these politicians would try to turn such a dirty firm around, that could be exploited by 
firms. In fact, the very appointment of a reputable politician, particularly one with an 
environmental track record, could be used by such firms as a symbolic act intended to positively 
influence the perception of outsiders of the firm’s environmental performance, even if the firm 
does not follow through with any substantive enhancements of that performance. If this happens, 
then the following should hold: 
  
Hypothesis 5. Firms with former politicians with environmental policy experience on the 
board that have the same objective environmental performance (e.g., pollution levels) as 
other firms will be more highly regarded by stakeholders. 
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Finally, since prior research has found that the human capital and social capital of former 
politicians will be higher the more tenure in political activities these former politicians have, the 
more complex and prestigious their tasks have been, and the less time has passed since their 
departure form politics (Lester et al., 2008). Therefore we argue: 
 
Hypothesis 6. The effects of hypotheses 1 to 5 will be  stronger the more tenure in the 
political arena former politicians, who come to the board, have, the more complex and 





We have discussed the potential contributions that former politicians on corporate boards may 
have for effectively implementing environmental strategies. Prior literature has discussed the 
purposes of politicians on corporate boards primarily from a resource-dependence perspective as 
potentially influencing political processes for the financial benefit of the firm (Hillman, 2005). In 
addition, the benefits of former politicians primarily have been captured as human and social 
capital regarding political processes (Lester et al, 2008). We extend this emerging research by 
considering politicians themselves as a resource and explore how they can aid firms in mastering 
other important strategic issues, notably environmental (green) management. In addition, we 
explore whether electing former politicians to  corporate boards is done for substantially 
improving the environmental performance of the firm or rather as a symbolic signal to mitigate 
stakeholder pressures. By this, we first contribute to the literature on board performance and 
improve our understanding of the complex relationships between board appointments, specific IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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firm strategies and eventual firm performance. We also contribute to the literature on 
environmental management, and in particular the emerging perspectives of “environmental 
governance” (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009a). 
 
Furthermore, our study is valuable for the managerial practice. Prior literature suggests that for 
firms in industries with low environmental performance and high waste production or emissions, 
for instance, in the chemical or the steel industry, there appears to be a high strategic potential 
for developing a differentiating brand from competitors by becoming green (King & Lenox, 
2002). Our study provides insights about how and why the appointment of politically 
experienced directors can be a valuable and rare means to establish this strategic potential for 
competitive advantage by increasing effectively the firm’s environmental performance.  IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-135-I                                 31/08/2011 
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